First, what cover-up? The White House releases an email. If they were covering up, they wouldn't have released it ever. Let everyone agree, yes Congress should have had that email a year ago. And that would have mattered how?
Would it have changed any of the following?
I won't paste in the entire Republican Committee report issued in February. In this snippet, even the Republicans have to acknowledge that there was no orders to stand down from the White House, no dereliction of duty. On and on it goes. Testimony up the wazoo. Countless hours spent. And the Senate did its thing too.
Both bodies issued reports that were critical. Few dispute that there were not operational and policies mistakes. And that is the difference between reasonable people and wackos.
Reasonable people say that was an awful thing that happened, this is what wasn't done right, this is what could be done better. Wackos start down the road of treason, impeachment, blah blah blah. Stuff that the normal vast majority of Americans have no patience for.
The Republicans have shot their wad on the ACA. They issue a report on Benghazi shutting down all the crazy theories. They hate that Obama got Bin Laden and helped get rid of Gaddafi. They got nothing so now they have to go down another rat hole full of bullshit.
Do they hold hearings on improving security at consulates?
How about helping the CIA? How about anything remotely useful to making the United States a better place?
No, they pick up some bullshit email that the White House releases, (some cover up) and go bat shit thinking they finally got him now....impeachment baby here we come.
News flash, this is just another in a long string of stupid things done by the party of stupid.
"Majority members believe the regional and global force posture assumed by the military on September 11, 2012 limited the response. Majority members recognize, of course, that it is impossible for the Department of Defense to have adequate forces prepared to respond immediately to every conceivable global contingency. Ensuring that preparations exist for some likely possibilities is not to be confused with the ability to anticipate all prospective circumstances, especially in highly volatile regions.
Majority members acknowledge that embassy security involves estimating and managing risk. Department representatives appearing before the committee pointed out that some danger will always be present, regardless of the preparations, especially in tension-prone areas of the world.64 Before the Benghazi attacks, there was also the presumption (in Libya and elsewhere) that indigenous forces would be more helpful in protecting Americans than proved to be the case.65
Given the militarys preparations on September 11, 2012, majority members have not yet discerned any response alternatives that could have likely changed the outcome of the Benghazi attack. While majority members are reluctant to disagree with specific tactical decisions made by professional career uniformed officers in the heat of battle and they believe the U.S. military performed well in responding to the attacks, it is nonetheless necessary to evaluate thoroughly the choices commanders made.
Limitations on situational awareness
Majority members also believe that the military response may have been complicated by the lack of much real-time knowledge of what was transpiring on the ground. The dearth of information seems relevant when considering how commanders shaped their response to the attack. For example, about 20 minutes after the attack started, CIA security personnel from a nearby CIA facility (informally known as the annex) raced to the SMC. Once there, CIA personnel exchanged fire with the attackers and then, joined by the SMC survivors, fought their way back to the annex. Amidst sporadic fire, that facility then took two discrete attacks, including a mortar barrage that killed CIA security personnel Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty.66
Significantly, however, DOD reported to the committee that General Ham and some others at AFRICOM did not know the annex existed before the attack on the SMC began.67
Learning about a second facility in Benghazi amidst an attack may have complicated the militarys process of assessing events and response options, in part because the second location was both an attack target and a U.S. security resource. Although the committee will continue to explore this point, majority members believe a combatant commanders apparent unfamiliarity with a vital detail in his Area of Responsibility further illustrates the deficiency of the review undertaken by the White House before September 11, 2012.
In addition, briefers reported that those attempting to respond to or assess the Benghazi attacks often used cell phones to communicate.68 Obviously, that communication technique in a location with an underdeveloped telecommunications infrastructure poses difficulties. Further, 18 As the committee was told, the first drone (and one that replaced it later) was able to provide information to rear headquarters, but personnel there believed the data was insufficient to guide the development of operational judgments.19
In considering possible threats in the AFRICOM region before the Benghazi attack, General Ham told the committee he personally dismissed the prospect of requesting a higher alert status or repositioning some U.S. F-16s. This is because he doubted their utility to any threat his command might face on September 11.77 Even after the attack started, General Ham and others in the Department discounted the possibility of beginning the process to arm and dispatch one or more of these fighters. Officials also worried about the presence of shoulder-fired Surface-to-Air missiles in Libya, the difficulty of vectoring any planes safely over the desired location, and the challenge of distinguishing friend from foe on the ground.78 "
First, what cover-up? The White House releases an... (
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