You obviously do not understand how large, world-class corporations must operate. The "direction for the actions" does not come from the Board. Board member responsibility is established in law. The board meets for a few hours quarterly and reviews program and financial data. It then discusses and votes on major policy proposals brought forth by senior management--things like starting or closing a product line, building a new plant or selling/closing an existing one, major outsourcing or insourcing decisions, changes to pension plans, hiring or firing senior executives etc. It isn't and can't possibly be involved in the day-to-day engineering, manufacturing, purchasing, sales, or administration operations. Between the Board and the first line worker are several layers of management who must daily implement the generalized policies through development of detailed guidelines and job instructions. Every level of management has its specific responsibilities for everything under its control, to include safety.

I'm glad that Canadian construction safety "suddenly" increased when managers became responsible. They should have been accountable all along.

I absolutely believe a company should make a profit to thrive and be successful. However, the company and its upper management must also accept the responsibility of doing what is not only best for the company but also what is best for its customers.

It is now clear through Boeing documents that upper management knew of the issues concerning MCAS and approved of the decisions not to mention it to the airlines and pilots when including it in the 737 MAX. They also knew that it was likely that MCAS had played a role in the Lion and Ethiopian air crashes but chose to misdirect shift responsibility onto the airline and pilots. Even after MCAS was cited as a possible cause, Boeing chose to continue to offer misinformation and denial. It was only after all the damning evidence came out that they finally accepted some responsibility.

As far as profits go, Boeing was a profitable company before the McDonnell Douglas merger when quality was still more important than share price. It was after the merger that Boeing started running into problems with technical and quality issues after downsizing their workforce and quality departments.

Yes, there is a lot of Boeing bashing going on recently but much of it may be deserved. First, let me say that I have always been a Boeing supporter and thought they made the best airplanes in the world. However, things changed at Boeing after the McDonnell Douglas merger, and not for the best. Upper management changed and started cutting costs by cutting corners and people. Speed and costs became more important than quality and safety. Boeing management became obsessed with keeping and maintaining the stock prices as high as possible. Their focus shifted from keeping customers happy and safe to keeping Wall Street happy.

This was exposed after the 737 Max crashes. Documents have been released that Boeing knew (and later lied about) the possible dangers with the MCAS system. Boeing knew all along that MCAS could be a problem but hoped they could "update" it and fix the issues while the aircraft was in service. Even after the crashes and Boeing knew that MCAS was at fault, they tried to shift blame to the airline and pilots.

MCAS description or operation was not described or even mentioned in the 737 Max manuals. Pilots and FAA inspectors did not even know it existed. In fact, Boeing employees were forbidden to mention MCAS to anyone outside the company, including the FAA. This was done by Boeing to speed up the certification of the Max aircraft by telling the airlines and pilots that the 737 Max flew exactly like the older 737s and required no additional training, an expensive cost for the airlines. All this has been revealed in released Boeing documents.

The door plug on Alaskan Airlines appears to be much the same. Boeing's first response was to blame its fuselage builders, Spirit Aerosystems, for shoddy build quality and poor quality control. Recently obtained documents now reveal that Boeing itself removed the door plug at its facility in Seattle and failed to reinstall the bolts that held the door in place. It also violated its own quality policies by NOT properly documenting the action of the door plug removal and replacement. Proper documentation would have ensured that an inspection of the reinstallation of the door plug would have taken place and the missing bolts would have been discovered. But this never happened.

Again, I am a Boeing supporter, and I truly hope they get their act together, but when they lie about their operations, and hide problems while not accepting responsibility for their actions, this becomes a huge problem for me. This is especially true when people's lives hang in the balance. These actions tell me they value money or share prices over the lives of the people who fly in and on their airplanes.

Management issues may also be apparent in other Boeing projects. The 777-9, the Air Force KC-46, and the Boeing Starliner commercial spacecraft have all experienced quality issues delaying their deliveries. I am sure regulators and customers of these aircraft are taking a much closer view of Boeing after the recent events.