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The Lull In Hostilities Between Iran And The U.S. Is Just Escalation In Disguise
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Jan 11, 2020 07:23:21   #
Kraken Loc: Barry's Bay
 
n the latest volley of violence between Iran and the United States, the world averted a disaster. Tehran’s response to last week’s U.S. drone strike that killed infamous Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani managed to pause the cycle of escalation by providing both sides exactly what each needed for the moment. Wednesday’s Iranian missile barrage at U.S. military forces in Iraq enabled Tehran to punctuate its three-day epic commemoration of Soleimani with a spectacular show of strength. And the fortuitous (or deliberate) lack of casualties offered President Donald Trump a welcome opportunity to exult in a perceived foreign policy win just as the 2020 election season gets underway.

The sense that Washington and Tehran had stepped back from the brink prompted audible sighs of relief, and a British royal drama replaced World War III as the top trending news story on social media. Unfortunately, while the world’s war jitters have indeed subsided, the crisis itself is nowhere near over. This week’s reprisals from Iran were not the end of the confrontation between Tehran and the Trump administration, but rather the beginning of a new, more dangerous and unpredictable phase of the long-running U.S.-Iranian hostilities.

Indeed, on Friday, U.S. officials announced a new round of punitive economic sanctions, specifically targeting eight individuals believed to have had a role in the Iranian missile strikes. These measures, along with new restrictions on Iran’s metals and textile industries, are unlikely to have significant economic impact, but for Tehran, new U.S. economic pressure will only be seen as a further confirmation of Trump’s aggressive and uncompromising approach to Iran.

The current lull after the initial exchange of fire is not surprising. Both sides appreciate the need to slow or reverse the rapid cycle of escalation unleashed by Soleimani’s killing. Iranian leaders have had a front-row seat for the demonstration of U.S. conventional military superiority in Iraq and elsewhere across the region, and they are sufficiently prudent to steer clear of making themselves the next target. That prudence was clear in Wednesday’s ballistic missile attack on Iraqi military bases at Ain al-Assad and Erbil. The rapidity, scope, and apparent precision of the Iranian response highlights the muscular principles of the Islamic Republic’s security doctrine, which holds that the regime’s survival depends on its strength and its readiness to go on the offensive. The imagery of Iranian firepower surely satisfied a domestic audience primed for vengeance after massive, nation-wide funeral processions.

However, Tehran’s prior warning to Iraqi counterparts seemed designed to minimize or avoid American casualties, as Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh asserted on Thursday. In this sense, the early Iranian response was consistent with the theocratic state’s calibrated, incremental escalation against U.S. interests and partners in Iraq and around the Persian Gulf over the past six months, when Washington ratcheted up economic pressure on Iran to unprecedented levels. In a series of mostly small-scale, precise attacks that culminated in September with a more consequential strike on Saudi oil infrastructure, Tehran sought to raise the costs to Washington and the world without placing itself in the cross-hairs of American firepower. The recent skirmishing gave Iran’s savvy strategists an accurate read on Trump’s aversion to further entanglements, and their calculation that a limited strike, with no fatalities, would avoid U.S. reprisals proved correct.

However, the recent track record only underscores why the U.S.-Iran confrontation is likely to escalate once again. Iran’s objective in its steady escalation since May—to compel an end to the Trump administration’s grueling economic sanctions that wreaked havoc on its economy—remains as pressing as ever, especially after massive protests rocked major cities around the country in November. And now, the regime’s determination to end the American siege is magnified by an ideological and strategic zeal to settle scores for Soleimani’s death, to preserve or even expand the footprint that he achieved for Iran across the broader Middle East, and ideally emerge from this crisis with some big strategic gain, such as durably eroding U.S. presence and influence in the broader Middle East. Tehran is also ramping back up its nuclear program, announcing shortly after the Soleimani strike new breaches of the 2015 nuclear deal that was first abrogated by Trump in 2018.

For that reason, it’s a virtual certainty that Wednesday’s missile barrage was not the end of the Iranian reprisals. Tehran’s next steps will likely continue the hallmarks of its playbook developed over the course of its 40-year campaign to entrench its own influence at the expense of its adversaries—purposeful rather than wanton projection of power, conscious of the balance of costs and benefits, opportunistic in exploiting openings or weakness, inventive in the application and wide-ranging in scope. This is a regime that has orchestrated terror attacks from Buenos Aires to Bulgaria; it wields considerable cyber capabilities as well as a network of semi-autonomous proxies. At least some of these groups, especially in Iraq, will be eager to avenge their own grievances against Washington, irrespective of any Iranian restraint. Faced with an American visegrip on their economy and advantageous unconventional capabilities, nothing will be off the table as Tehran assesses its next moves against the United States.

For its part, the Trump administration is not immune to the temptation of escalation, as was demonstrated vividly over the past 10 days. In principle, the president doesn’t want to initiate another costly, protracted American military intervention in the Middle East. He correctly read the war weariness of Americans long before it became an accepted political fact, and he has only disdain for investing in the development of a more peaceful or prosperous international system.

However, his Iran policy has been consistently aggressive since the earliest days of the administration, across the rotating cast of his senior national security advisors. This reflects a calculus with broad support among the Republican national security establishment that confrontation rather than engagement represents the most effective way to deter the threats posed by Iran. In a mirror image of the worldview in Tehran, the White House is driven by the conviction that American reluctance to use force to deter or punish Tehran and its proxies has only invited Iranian expansion and empowered its regional posture. From this perspective, Washington can only prevail if we are prepared to risk blowback and take the fight to them in the arena of our own advantage—conventional warfare.

This, not an intemperate Powerpoint slide or an obsession with the 1979 embassy seizure, is what drove the decision to take the momentous step of taking out Tehran’s most capable regional military commander. And so far, the Trump administration sees the logic of its get-tough approach validated. The fallout has been bearable, the domestic economy remains unscathed, and the administration’s base is energized by the perception of a big foreign policy victory against a notorious villain, timed at an opportune moment as his reelection campaign gets underway. Especially in the absence of any serious framework for durable de-escalation or negotiations, the administration’s perception that its risky Soleimani strike paid off will tempt them to meet future Iranian provocations with further confrontation. And with the nuclear agreement on the verge of collapse, the White House will be inclined to embrace an even more assertive posture as Iranian stockpiles of enriched uranium accumulate and reduce Tehran’s breakout time to nuclear weapons capability.

The crisis has abated for the moment, but there should be no illusions. Washington and Tehran are now locked into a long, unpredictable conflict with Iran where the propensity for miscalculation is high. Finding a persuasive diplomatic exit ramp that can circumvent the risk of future conflict needs to be the highest priority.

https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/11/qassem-soleimani-iran-united-states-tension-097347

Reply
Jan 11, 2020 08:31:39   #
SteveR Loc: Michigan
 
Well, at least Iran has a sense of who they're dealing with in Trump. Maybe the Dems would prefer somebody like Pete Buttigieg to face down the Ayatollah.

Reply
Jan 11, 2020 08:35:15   #
travelwp Loc: New Jersey
 
Kraken wrote:
politico.com


really ?

Reply
 
 
Jan 11, 2020 09:21:29   #
EyeSawYou
 
SteveR wrote:
Well, at least Iran has a sense of who they're dealing with in Trump. Maybe the Dems would prefer somebody like Pete Buttigieg to face down the Ayatollah.


Well to be fair, BUTTigieg loves to lead from behind, he's more comfortable in that position.

Reply
Jan 11, 2020 10:14:33   #
Steven Seward Loc: Cleveland, Ohio
 
Kraken wrote:
n the latest volley of violence between Iran and the United States, the world averted a disaster. Tehran’s response to last week’s U.S. drone strike that killed infamous Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani managed to pause the cycle of escalation by providing both sides exactly what each needed for the moment. Wednesday’s Iranian missile barrage at U.S. military forces in Iraq enabled Tehran to punctuate its three-day epic commemoration of Soleimani with a spectacular show of strength. And the fortuitous (or deliberate) lack of casualties offered President Donald Trump a welcome opportunity to exult in a perceived foreign policy win just as the 2020 election season gets underway.

The sense that Washington and Tehran had stepped back from the brink prompted audible sighs of relief, and a British royal drama replaced World War III as the top trending news story on social media. Unfortunately, while the world’s war jitters have indeed subsided, the crisis itself is nowhere near over. This week’s reprisals from Iran were not the end of the confrontation between Tehran and the Trump administration, but rather the beginning of a new, more dangerous and unpredictable phase of the long-running U.S.-Iranian hostilities.

Indeed, on Friday, U.S. officials announced a new round of punitive economic sanctions, specifically targeting eight individuals believed to have had a role in the Iranian missile strikes. These measures, along with new restrictions on Iran’s metals and textile industries, are unlikely to have significant economic impact, but for Tehran, new U.S. economic pressure will only be seen as a further confirmation of Trump’s aggressive and uncompromising approach to Iran.

The current lull after the initial exchange of fire is not surprising. Both sides appreciate the need to slow or reverse the rapid cycle of escalation unleashed by Soleimani’s killing. Iranian leaders have had a front-row seat for the demonstration of U.S. conventional military superiority in Iraq and elsewhere across the region, and they are sufficiently prudent to steer clear of making themselves the next target. That prudence was clear in Wednesday’s ballistic missile attack on Iraqi military bases at Ain al-Assad and Erbil. The rapidity, scope, and apparent precision of the Iranian response highlights the muscular principles of the Islamic Republic’s security doctrine, which holds that the regime’s survival depends on its strength and its readiness to go on the offensive. The imagery of Iranian firepower surely satisfied a domestic audience primed for vengeance after massive, nation-wide funeral processions.

However, Tehran’s prior warning to Iraqi counterparts seemed designed to minimize or avoid American casualties, as Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh asserted on Thursday. In this sense, the early Iranian response was consistent with the theocratic state’s calibrated, incremental escalation against U.S. interests and partners in Iraq and around the Persian Gulf over the past six months, when Washington ratcheted up economic pressure on Iran to unprecedented levels. In a series of mostly small-scale, precise attacks that culminated in September with a more consequential strike on Saudi oil infrastructure, Tehran sought to raise the costs to Washington and the world without placing itself in the cross-hairs of American firepower. The recent skirmishing gave Iran’s savvy strategists an accurate read on Trump’s aversion to further entanglements, and their calculation that a limited strike, with no fatalities, would avoid U.S. reprisals proved correct.

However, the recent track record only underscores why the U.S.-Iran confrontation is likely to escalate once again. Iran’s objective in its steady escalation since May—to compel an end to the Trump administration’s grueling economic sanctions that wreaked havoc on its economy—remains as pressing as ever, especially after massive protests rocked major cities around the country in November. And now, the regime’s determination to end the American siege is magnified by an ideological and strategic zeal to settle scores for Soleimani’s death, to preserve or even expand the footprint that he achieved for Iran across the broader Middle East, and ideally emerge from this crisis with some big strategic gain, such as durably eroding U.S. presence and influence in the broader Middle East. Tehran is also ramping back up its nuclear program, announcing shortly after the Soleimani strike new breaches of the 2015 nuclear deal that was first abrogated by Trump in 2018.

For that reason, it’s a virtual certainty that Wednesday’s missile barrage was not the end of the Iranian reprisals. Tehran’s next steps will likely continue the hallmarks of its playbook developed over the course of its 40-year campaign to entrench its own influence at the expense of its adversaries—purposeful rather than wanton projection of power, conscious of the balance of costs and benefits, opportunistic in exploiting openings or weakness, inventive in the application and wide-ranging in scope. This is a regime that has orchestrated terror attacks from Buenos Aires to Bulgaria; it wields considerable cyber capabilities as well as a network of semi-autonomous proxies. At least some of these groups, especially in Iraq, will be eager to avenge their own grievances against Washington, irrespective of any Iranian restraint. Faced with an American visegrip on their economy and advantageous unconventional capabilities, nothing will be off the table as Tehran assesses its next moves against the United States.

For its part, the Trump administration is not immune to the temptation of escalation, as was demonstrated vividly over the past 10 days. In principle, the president doesn’t want to initiate another costly, protracted American military intervention in the Middle East. He correctly read the war weariness of Americans long before it became an accepted political fact, and he has only disdain for investing in the development of a more peaceful or prosperous international system.

However, his Iran policy has been consistently aggressive since the earliest days of the administration, across the rotating cast of his senior national security advisors. This reflects a calculus with broad support among the Republican national security establishment that confrontation rather than engagement represents the most effective way to deter the threats posed by Iran. In a mirror image of the worldview in Tehran, the White House is driven by the conviction that American reluctance to use force to deter or punish Tehran and its proxies has only invited Iranian expansion and empowered its regional posture. From this perspective, Washington can only prevail if we are prepared to risk blowback and take the fight to them in the arena of our own advantage—conventional warfare.

This, not an intemperate Powerpoint slide or an obsession with the 1979 embassy seizure, is what drove the decision to take the momentous step of taking out Tehran’s most capable regional military commander. And so far, the Trump administration sees the logic of its get-tough approach validated. The fallout has been bearable, the domestic economy remains unscathed, and the administration’s base is energized by the perception of a big foreign policy victory against a notorious villain, timed at an opportune moment as his reelection campaign gets underway. Especially in the absence of any serious framework for durable de-escalation or negotiations, the administration’s perception that its risky Soleimani strike paid off will tempt them to meet future Iranian provocations with further confrontation. And with the nuclear agreement on the verge of collapse, the White House will be inclined to embrace an even more assertive posture as Iranian stockpiles of enriched uranium accumulate and reduce Tehran’s breakout time to nuclear weapons capability.

The crisis has abated for the moment, but there should be no illusions. Washington and Tehran are now locked into a long, unpredictable conflict with Iran where the propensity for miscalculation is high. Finding a persuasive diplomatic exit ramp that can circumvent the risk of future conflict needs to be the highest priority.

https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/11/qassem-soleimani-iran-united-states-tension-097347
n the latest volley of violence between Iran and t... (show quote)

Kraken, where do you find this tripe? The author acts as if we're on the brink of World War III, with Iran holding the U.S. in check with their "spectacular show of strength." The truth is that the United States is like a big lazy bear who couldn't be bothered swatting the numerous flies buzzing around his hide. Finally the bear got mad and crushed a dozen flies with one blow.

There was never any threat that Iran would seriously strike back, as evidenced by their "purposeful miss" with the rockets. The author never mentions that this was an Iranian public relations stunt where they told their own people that "80 American soldiers were killed in the attack." Instead he portrays it as some brilliant master strategy instead of a desperate attempt to save face. Despite what this author says, there is no chance that Iran's strategy is "purposeful rather than wanton projection of power, conscious of the balance of costs and benefits, opportunistic in exploiting openings or weakness, inventive in the application and wide-ranging in scope." The guy is reading too many Tom Clancy novels.

Truth is, Iran predictably backed down because they don't want to get wiped off the face of the Earth like a tiger stepping on a microbe. It must have come as a shock to them that Trump was not going to bend over and take it in the a$$ like Obama.

Iran just killed 63 of his fellow Canadians in the airplane attack, and Kraken is worried about Trump.

Reply
Jan 11, 2020 10:47:19   #
Frank T Loc: New York, NY
 
Buttigieg, I might remind you has actually been in combat, while Trump.is still nursing his imaginary bone spurs.

Reply
Jan 11, 2020 20:32:53   #
SteveS Loc: The US is my home.
 
Frank T wrote:
Buttigieg, I might remind you has actually been in combat, while Trump.is still nursing his imaginary bone spurs.


Buttigieg served 7 months in Afghanistan, but it wasn't in combat. Ask a veteran who has actually been shot at if they believe someone who identified and disrupting financial networks as having combat experience.

Reply
 
 
Jan 11, 2020 20:38:11   #
Kraken Loc: Barry's Bay
 
SteveS wrote:
Buttigieg served 7 months in Afghanistan, but it wasn't in combat. Ask a veteran who has actually been shot at if they believe someone who identified and disrupting financial networks as having combat experience.


Give it up your hero is a draft dodger.

Reply
Jan 11, 2020 21:19:34   #
SteveS Loc: The US is my home.
 
Kraken wrote:
Give it up your hero is a draft dodger.


Since you don't agree with Trump, and you don't like Trudeau, but (pun intended) you want to defend Buttigieg, that tells me a lot about your other preferences. Hang in there cupcake.

Reply
Jan 11, 2020 21:24:26   #
Kraken Loc: Barry's Bay
 
SteveS wrote:
Since you don't agree with Trump, and you don't like Trudeau, but (pun intended) you want to defend Buttigieg, that tells me a lot about your other preferences. Hang in there cupcake.


What are you smoking???? I have never mentioned the name Buttigieg in any of my posts EVER. Boy you trumpsters are good at making stuff up. You have learnt from the best ,Your liar and chief cadet bone spurs trump.

Reply
Jan 11, 2020 21:35:16   #
SteveS Loc: The US is my home.
 
Kraken wrote:
What are you smoking???? I have never mentioned the name Buttigieg in any of my posts EVER. Boy you trumpsters are good at making stuff up. You have learnt from the best ,Your liar and chief cadet bone spurs trump.


You answered my comment on Buttigieg's combat experience, with a rebuttal about Trump. That's recognition by association! Maybe you should read before you stick your foot in your mouth. Keep protecting your boy cupcake.

Reply
 
 
Jan 11, 2020 21:42:03   #
boberic Loc: Quiet Corner, Connecticut. Ex long Islander
 
Kraken wrote:
Give it up your hero is a draft dodger.


Just for the record. You can't be a draft dodger if you have never been drafted. Draft avoider is more accurate. Clinton also avoided the draft. My only military experience was a pre-induction physicial. My height was mistakenly measured at 6 foot 8 inches. Was I a draft dodger because I didn't correct the error?

Reply
Jan 11, 2020 21:43:53   #
Kraken Loc: Barry's Bay
 
boberic wrote:
Just for the record. You can't be a draft dodger if you have never been drafted. Draft avoider is more accurate. Clinton also avoided the draft. My only military experience was a pre-induction physicial. My height was mistakenly measured at 6 foot 8 inches. Was I a draft dodger because I didn't correct the error?


Sure looks that way.

Reply
Jan 12, 2020 05:33:06   #
Steven Seward Loc: Cleveland, Ohio
 
Kraken wrote:
Sure looks that way.

So why don't you tell us about your military and combat experience since you are casting aspersions about others' lack of military service.

Reply
Jan 12, 2020 09:50:22   #
Wrangler Loc: North Texas
 
Steven Seward wrote:
So why don't you tell us about your military and combat experience since you are casting aspersions about others' lack of military service.


I would like to hear his military tales also.

Reply
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