The real world is that the Boeings and other industries are not accountable industries. They are made up of individuals. Those individuals are the ones that have made errors in the certification of the Max aircraft.
Of course the Northwest region of FAA is just as bad by employing those same individuals who used to work at Boeing as quality persons. Ask me how I know!

As a lifelong quality person in the aerospace industry and as one who was fired by 'upper management' in a large helicopter company when I threatened to go to the FAA about a safety issue which eventually caused two pilots to lose their lives, the reality is most people are not able to stand up to managements desire to kick an aircraft out the door. When I went to the FAA they didn't pursue an investigation as it was not something their own employees had uncovered so they weren't going to take a stand about Quality or the lack thereof at one of the companies they had approved to operate.

In the Max case, an individual at Boeing probably said "this is similar to the previous models we make, let's get it into the hands of the operators as quickly as we can".

Somewhere within Boeing an individual, not a corporation, dropped the ball by not making sure the new system was documented in the flight manuals. Then a person in the FAA certification office did not require a triple redundant sensor for this new system. The FAA just said OK. I suspect that during the 'official flight testing by FAA pilots' there was likely no disagreement between the two sensors so the system as designed did not require an aggressive action by the pilots to counteract the system pushing the nose down.

The FAA was likely being pushed by Boeing to approve the flight manuals. One person at Boeing did not have the wherewithal to stand up and say the flight manual is deficient!
These tragedies are most likely the result of a poor system design by a person at Boeing. Also someone at the FAA just kicked the can down the road by not included the system explanation in the flight manuals. A lack of training on the system by the airlines is a secondary cause.

The planes did not have the software installed as most pilots were properly trained.
Only lazy pilots and poor quality airlines who failed to do proper training had the problem.
The software "Fix" is to address airline training failures and poor pilot training regarding the specific plane.
Just watched an "Air Diasters" show where an Air Bus went down for a similar poor training third world airline. Pilots had an issue that good pilots train for regarding the Airbus software. These pilot did not train and total time in type was like 2 hours between the pilots.
So why are you not bashing Airbus? Politics?

Years ago the U.S. had two agencies involved with aviation. The CAB was charged with promoting aviation and regulating routes. The CAA was charged with policing and licensing aviation. Both agencies were combined into the FAA who is charged with both activities. There is a conflict of interest in promoting and policing any activity. That may be some of the problems with the FAA's performance. The comments about pilot training and manufacturing interests also are valid and play a roll in accident prevention, especially in this case. 56 hours of training on an I-Pad hardly seems adequate and 200 hours of flight training for a second officer in a modern jet aircraft seems almost criminal. In 1938 in a DC-3 a minimum of 250 hours and a commercial license was required for a second officer. Keep it up Boeing and the old saying "If it ain't Boeing I ain't going" is going to be changed by moving the ain't.