Completely agree there needs to be separation of the event with the mistakenly closed exhaust damper, which ultimately lead to a power loss, from the unexpected power loss while en route after having departed the dock.....unless, further investigation reveals the exhaust damper was not properly reset after the incident at the dock, and did not remain in the properly open position when underway.
IF that did occur, it would affect the ability to restart and operate the power units of the vessel, if it was not found and corrected right away. Ok, that may be a stretch, possibly, but maybe worth considering if no failures within the electrical circuitry can be identified.
The very basic, simplified electrical diagram does not do justice to showing the real complexities of the various inter-related circuits and many, many thousands of yards of wiring in that vessel. There are a lot of places for physical faults and a lot of sensors and intermediate circuits which because of shorting, overloading, or conditions outside the design parameters, may lead to shut down of the system to prevent serious damage to components in the overall system.
The unexpected electrical problem while in route, may not necessarily even have to be within the main circuits for the generators and main propulsion engine. There may be possibilities a problem developed in external circuits related to power for the refrigerated containers, for example, that was unknown/undetected before leaving the dock, which was great enough to lead to auto-disconnect of the systems closer to the supply end.
Sure, it's possible there was a problem in the transformer which had been unused for several months, but that puts a question in my mind as to why it apparently operated ok for 10-12 hours after being put on line at the earlier incident at the dock. If there was a major issue with it, seems it may not have handled the load for that 10-12 hours without some kind of indication of trouble, if it was not performing properly.
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There are so many potential contributing factors to the course change, and for some of those, it may not be possible to replicate the exact combination of conditions at the time of straying off course. Yes, there is a record of sensors and rudder position and generators and speed and ship location, etc, .....ship data information.... in the data recordings, which may prove helpful to some extent.
However, I cannot help but think of the outside forces, not on those data recorders, and how the exact combination of them has an influence on that vessel adrift.
By the Baltimore harbor navigation chart, it looks as though the Dali was probably right at the confluence of the Fort McHenry Channel, in which it was travelling, and the Curtis Bay Channel which joins the Fort McHenry right there at about 0.6 mile upstream of the Key Bridge.
What exactly was in force below the surface of the water there where the channels join and currents mix and varying depths are in fairly close proximity in relatively narrow channelways with tidal eddies and currents and possible rip currents adding to the mix?.....there is just a lot of variable force at work there, working in tandem with or opposition to the surface factors of surface currents of both water and air movement.
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The preliminary report states only a three degree change in heading of the vessel. To some, I suppose that doesn't seem like much, but I'm sure you are aware three degrees of rotation on an arm about 980 feet long is not an insignificant distance, especially in a channel with limited space for maneuvering.
Here's what I would still love to know, and maybe in the murky water there, and with the passage of weeks and twice-daily tide changes it will never be possible to determine.....did the Dali ever make contact with the bottom along the side of the main dredged channel, or an unknown shoal or sand bar at the bottom of the dredged channel, back there where the Fort McHenry and Curtis Bay channels meet?
The Baltimore Harbor navigation chart shows the dredged depth of those channels is supposed to be 50', about 10' more than the reported draft of the Dali when it departed the dock. But also, the navigation chart shows the surveyed depth rises to around 31' - 33' right along the side of that dredged channel, about 7' - 9' less than the reported draft of Dali when it left the dock.
Unsurprisingly, there is a notation on the chart that it is not possible to know the exact shape and boundary of those dredged channels at all times, because too many changes can be constant due to tidal influences and silting and erosion of the sides of the dredge works.
Then, all this leads me up to the continuation of my wondering.... at what point did the Dali actually begin going aground in the vicinity of the bridge pillars? The navigation chart shows surveyed depths of around 28' - 31' toward the outer edge of those pillars, with an unspecified wavy line toward their inner edge, indicating that uncertain transition of depth along the edge of the dredged channel.
From the preliminary report, it appears that the momentum of that mass had slowed from about 8.5 mph to about 6.5 mph by the time it made contact with the bridge pillar. I think I may forever remain curious how much of that reduction in movement is due to the Dali already being in contact with the bottom, maybe even the greater part of a minute before contact was made with the bridge support.
Completely agree there needs to be separation of t... (
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